Somalia’s president is not just seeking re-election; he is rewriting the constitution to make defeat impossible.

In January, I floated a proposal that Somalia establish a caretaker government to manage its 2026 electoral transition. The response confirmed what many Somalis already sense – the forthcoming elections are not simply another round of political horse-trading. They are a test of whether Somalia’s political class can resist the gravitational pull of authoritarian consolidation at a moment when Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are being tested amid a “rupture” of the rules-based order, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put it.

Since sharing that proposal for a caretaker government, the situation has deteriorated in ways that demand we clearly name what is happening in Mogadishu. It is not the typical dysfunction found in Somali electoral politics. Rather, it is the intentional engineering of a multi-party electoral autocracy – a system in which the machinery of democracy is preserved in form while being stripped of its substantive elements.

The Playbook

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is pursuing a third term, and the constitution offers no barrier. The 2012 Provisional Constitution contained no presidential term limits. Since 2024, the current administration has undertaken a rushed and illegitimate constitutional amendment process that doesn’t meet the requirements for amendment set out in the Provisional Constitution.

In March 2024, the constitutional amendments appeared as democratic protections (direct elections for several federal, regional and municipal offices, election timing guarantees, and a bottom-up party system framework). To my disappointment, the January 2026 amendments have removed many of those safeguards, leaving them to be detailed in ordinary legislation.

Let me be very clear: the 4.5 clan-based system is far from ideal, and it is reasonable to argue that Somalia may not be able to afford yet another round of indirect elections. However, because the need for reform is so great, the process must be above board. A manipulated reform process does not fix the 4.5 system. It replaces one form of elite capture with another, trading clan-based power-sharing for a party-based system designed to entrench a single political faction. The question is not whether to reform, but whether a process controlled by the incumbent, rushed through a coerced parliament, and stripped of federal consensus qualifies as reform at all.

What has transpired in parliament over this latest round of constitutional amendments- armed police occupying the chamber, a female lawmaker assaulted, the suspension of 25 parliamentarians for opposing amendments of Chapter 4 of the constitution, this is not the behaviour of a government preparing for credible and fair elections. It is the behaviour of an administration manufacturing its own re-election.

The Evidence: How Manipulation is Taking Root

The March 2024 amendments promised democratic progress: direct elections at the federal, regional, and municipal levels, guarantees of election timing, and a bottom-up multi-party framework. Yet neither they nor the January 2026 amendments introduced presidential term limits. Today, there remains no constitutional barrier to indefinite re-election of the president of the Federal Republic.

First, democratic protections are being systematically moved from the Constitution, where they require a two-thirds supermajority and a referendum to change, into ordinary legislation requiring only a simple majority. The Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission has claimed that provisions have been “relocated” to later constitutional chapters. When a constitution does not specify the methods, timing, and conditions for direct elections, those eprotections against election fraud disappear and the constitution then only provides aspirations rather than guarantees. There is a reason Kenya’s 2010 Constitution does not simply state that “the president shall be elected.” It specifies direct election and places presidential term limits behind referendum requirements, because its drafters understood that election rules in ordinary legislation are rules the incumbent controls.

Second, we see the reversal of democratic gatekeeping. Under the March 2024 amendments, it was up to voters to decide which parties would become national parties through the district council elections. The January 2026 amendments replace this with a top-down system, under which Parliament passes a bill governing party registration, and any organisation that obtains 10% of parliamentary seats becomes a national party. The result is that the party gatekeeping role falls to a parliament controlled by the executive, creating an almost self-reinforcing cycle: whoever controls parliament determines which parties exist, and whoever controls who enters the race has shaped the next election before a ballot is cast.

Third, it is the rush itself. Constitutional amendments of this magnitude require deliberation, federal consensus, and time. Kenya’s 2010 Constitution took two years of inclusive deliberation and a national referendum before it took effect. Somalia’s constitutional review process has excluded several actors, including several federal member states, and is being rushed through parliament, with dissenting lawmakers suspended, as an election looms. This is not incidental. Rushing constitutional reforms ahead of an election is a deliberate tactic. It creates a fait accompli locking in the electoral rules of the game before it can be scrutinised or contested.

The clearest single piece of evidence that these amendments serve the incumbent’s survival rather than democratic reform is the presidential term extension. The 2012 Provisional Constitution set a four-year presidential term. The March 2024 amendments changed this to five. If treated as having entered into force, this single provision extends the current administration’s mandate from May 2026 to May 2027, giving the administration an additional year to finalise the remaining constitutional chapters, pass an Electoral Law whose substantive provisions the incumbent would shape, and build the parliamentary majority needed to control the next election. This is not an incidental detail buried in the constitutional text. It is the amendment that most directly reveals the manipulation at hand.

A Constitution Amended Against Itself

What makes this process not merely rushed but constitutionally questionable is that the Provisional Constitution prescribes exactly how it may be amended. Under Article 132, amendments must undergo a procedural process that requires both houses of parliament to form a joint committee. That committee must ensure public debate, engage Federal Member State legislatures, and produce a report put up for adoption, requiring a two-thirds supermajority in both Houses and a referendum before amendments can be adopted.

It remains deeply unclear whether these requirements have been meaningfully fulfilled. Puntland and Jubaland have formally rejected the constitutional review process, there is little evidence of meaningful public consultation, the constitutionally mandated three-month “cooling off” period appears unobserved, and no referendum has been announced or observed. This constitution is effectively being amended in violation of its own amendment procedures.

The Zimbabwe Mirror

The parallels with Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe should alarm every Somali who cares about the trajectory our democracy is going in.

Between 2009 and 2013, during Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government, the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), shared power following the 2008 electoral crisis. Ahead of the 2013 elections, ZANU-PF hijacked the constitutional reform process. What was meant to be a consensus exercise became an instrument of the ruling party’s advantage. The original constitutional draft was rewritten. The Constitutional Court (controlled by ZANU-PF) imposed a rushed election deadline of July 2013, preventing the agreed-upon electoral reforms from being implemented on time. Moreover, diaspora voters, overwhelmingly supporters of the opposition, were disenfranchised.

The election went ahead. Multiple parties competed. SADC and the African Union endorsed the result, with the outcome being determined long before a single ballot was cast. Zimbabwe’s 2013 elections demonstrated that going through constitutional and electoral motions, a constitutional review process here, a referendum there, can generate legitimacy even when the underlying process has been thoroughly manipulated.

The instrument differs - a court order in Harare, a parliamentary steamroller in Mogadishu - but the logic is identical: control the process to ensure that genuine reform that provides checks and balances never constrains your advantage.

This is the lesson Somalia’s international partners must absorb. The United Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and bilateral partners engaging with Somalia’s transition must not lend legitimacy to a process that mirrors ZANU-PF’s playbook. Concretely, this means: refusing to finance, monitor, or legitimize elections conducted under a constitutional framework adopted by a procedure not meeting the requirements of Article 132; insisting on meaningful participation from the Federal Member State and opposition prior to supporting elections; and stating publicly that rushed amendments passed over the objections of excluded stakeholders cannot provide the legitimate basis for holding national elections.

The Choice at Hand

The trajectory we are currently on is not inevitable. The vicious cycle of incumbents overseeing their own succession can be broken.

Manipulations of the constitutional reform process and the electoral framework are not problems requiring different solutions. Each is a symptom of the same illness: an incumbent designing the rules of his return to power. The rushed amendments, the legislative capture of electoral rules, and the exclusion of Federal Member States are all products of the structural conflict of interest created when a sitting president works to manipulate the rules of the game to ensure his own succession.

This is why the caretaker government argument I advanced in January is now more relevant than it was at the time. In light of what the constitutional amendment process has revealed, the case is now more fundamental. It is a proposal for preventing the establishment of a multi-party electoral autocracy - a system designed not to democratize Somalia but to keep the incumbent in power under a veil of competitive politics.

The Somali people deserve elections that are genuinely competitive, administered by impartial institutions, and conducted under a constitution that commands federal consensus. That window is closing. Every day, the current administration’s electoral and constitutional manipulation hardens. But it has not closed yet- and we must act to keep it open. The January 2026 constitutional amendments should be unequivocally rejected, not because constitutional reform is unnecessary, but because a process this consequential cannot be rushed in the final months of a sitting government’s term with the express purpose of shaping the rules of its own reelection. Reform of this magnitude must be undertaken by a succeeding administration with a fresh mandate and the time, legitimacy, and federal consensus that Article 132 demands. Anything less is not democratic reform - it’s entrenchment.

What Must Be Done

A diagnosis of the problem is not sufficient. Here is what must happen, and who must act, before the window closes.

1. For Somali Leaders: Federal Member States, the opposition, and civil society must issue a unified, unequivocal rejection of the January 2026 amendments on the grounds that they violate Article 132’s requirements for federal consensus and a referendum. This rejection must be paired with a positive demand: a time-bound, neutral caretaker government to manage the election, led by figures who have signed binding self-denying ordinances barring them from contesting it. An incumbent cannot be trusted to oversee his own succession.

2. For International Partners: Conditionality, not complicity. A public declaration that no support—financial, technical, or observational—will be provided for elections conducted under a constitution adopted in violation of Article 132. A clear statement that the international community does not recognise the claimed extension of the presidential mandate to May 2027. To finance this process is to underwrite the entrenchment of a single political faction.

3. The Objective: A pause. Not to stop reform, but to rescue it from being hijacked. A neutral authority should manage the next 6-12 months following the end of the current administration’s term in May 2026. This would create the political space to reach genuine federal consensus on the electoral framework. The current path we are heading leads to a multi-party electoral autocracy. The alternative provides a pathway towards a democratic U-turn. The difference will be determined by the courage of Somali leaders and the clarity of our partners in the weeks ahead.

• Xukuumad kasta oo xil haysa tan iyo 2012-kii ay ku fashilantay inay si dhexdhexaad ah u maamusho doorasho

• Hay’adaha dowladeed loo adeegsaday dano siyaasadeed

• Kalsooni darradu ay noqotay astaanta doorasho kasta

Xalka la soo jeediyay waa in maamulka doorashooyinka laga qaado xukuumadda xilkeedu dhammaaday, laguna wareejiyo dawlad howl qabad ah oo dhexdhexaad ah oo leh muddo xaddidan, awood xaddidan, iyo masuuliyad cad.

Qodobada ugu muhiimsan ee la soo jeedinayo waxaa ka mid ah:

• Heshiis siyaasadeed oo qaran oo lagu dhisayo Dawlad howl qabad ah oo dhexdhexaad ah

• Sharciyad ka timaadda ilo badan: Federaalka, Dowlad-goboleedyada, odayaasha dhaqanka, culimada, bulshada rayidka ah, iyo dammaanad-qaadayaal caalami ah

• In xubnaha dawlad howl qabad ah oo dhexdhexaad ah ahi aysan u tartami karin doorasho ama xil siyaasadeed

• In awoodda dawladdu ku koobnaato doorashooyin, amni, iyo adeegyada aasaasiga ah

• In Guddiga Doorashooyinka Qaranka si buuxda loo xoojiyo
  In muddo-xileedka dawlad howl qabad ah oo dhexdhexaad ah ahi uusan ka badnaan 12 bilood laga bilaabo 15-ka May 2026

Tani ma aha qorshe mucaarad, mana aha mid xisbi gaar ah u adeegaya. Waa hindise qaran oo lagu ilaalinayo madaxbannaanida, midnimada, iyo karaamada Soomaaliya xilli caalamku noqday mid sii halis badan.

The cycle of term extensions that has characterised Somali politics since 2012 has not resolved crises but rather has exacerbated them. It has led to the erosion of legitimacy, deepened divisions and pushed a meaningful and lasting political settlement further out of reach. There is no basis for the illegal extension of the current administration’s tenure, especially when that same administration looks to manage the 2026 electoral process.

Caretaker governments are temporary arrangements designed to address one or more issues that include: (i) mistrust; (ii) the need for greater transparency; and (iii) the need to check the power of an outgoing government to level the playing field for political actors. All of these conditions are present today in Somalia ahead of the 2026 elections.

The international community’s repeated intervention to mediate Somali electoral disputes signals to the world that Somalia cannot self-govern, the very perception that undermines our sovereignty. A homegrown caretaker government arrangement, developed by Somalis and accountable to Somalis, offers an opportunity to break this cycle. This is a Somali solution for Somali problems – one that draws on international best practice but adapts it to our context.

Introduction

Somalia is at an inflection point in its modern history.

The scheduled end of the term of the Hassan Sheikh Mohamud administration on May 15, 2026, alongside heightened tensions in the region, largely owing to Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland, makes the upcoming electoral transition the most consequential in Somalia’s post-civil war history.

Somalia faces both internal and external threats to its sovereignty. The external challenges include Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland, the effective end of the post-World War II global order that guaranteed the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, and the Red Sea Crisis, which has elevated the Horn of Africa’s strategic significance. There are also internal challenges from patterns of electoral crises and dysfunction that have characterised every Somali election since 2012 alongside internal political divisions. No transition has happened without serious controversies, irregularities, delays, and concerns regarding legitimacy. The unilateral constitutional amendments in addition to the recent attempts to make additional amendments by the current administration have further eroded confidence and raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the constitution itself.

As I’ve made the case in my op-ed, the way in which Somali political actors manage the 2026 electoral transition will send a clear message to the world on whether the Somali people can govern themselves.

This is a vicious cycle. A lack of electoral legitimacy begets challenges to our sovereignty. Somalia’s electoral legitimacy is the shield behind which we defend our sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somalia’s political class must demonstrate the political maturity and social cohesion to protect its sovereignty in an increasingly hostile international environment.

This proposal presents new alternatives to create a virtuous circle in which neutral electoral management produces a credible outcome that signals to the world that the Somali people can govern themselves, that their sovereignty is inviolable, and that their divisions cannot be exploited. The recommendations in the proposal are agnostic on the electoral model. The caretaker government’s mandate is not to determine how Somalis elect their leaders, but to neutrally implement whatever framework emerges from negotiations between the Federal Government, Federal Member States, and the opposition during the ongoing national dialogues.

We have chosen unity before

The Somali Youth League once galvanised a divided Somalia around a unifying idea: that Somalis belonged to a single political community and deserved sovereignty over our lands. This spirit must be revived, not as a nostalgic dream, but as a strategic necessity.

In my op-ed I invoked the Somali proverb: “waloolo coloobay, way xoolo yarayaan, wayna xabaalo badiyaan” – when brothers fight, they diminish their wealth and increase their graves. In essence, this proverb encapsulates the underlying truth of Somalia’s current situation, including the forthcoming elections: irreconcilable and intractable political divisions do not benefit Somalis, while external actors are eager to exploit those divisions.

The Reforms Somalia Needs

Those who care about the future of Somalia would be the first to highlight that reforms are needed to put an end to the existing patterns of electoral dysfunction, the constitutional and political crises and the evident shortcomings in how electoral transitions have been managed since 2012.

For far too long, incumbent governments have leveraged the state apparatus during elections to attempt to manipulate the process in their favour, casting serious doubt on the electoral legitimacy of the process.

Since 2012, Somalia’s various electoral transitions (2012, 2017, 2022) have entrusted incumbent political administrations with the responsibility of fairly managing the electoral process, yet these transitions have sowed the seeds of division and undermined electoral legitimacy. At this juncture when a lot is at stake for Somalia in terms of its sovereignty and unity, we must now entrust electoral management to neutral officials.

This proposal sets out the case for an election-time, non-political caretaker government to manage the 2026 electoral process. It aims to learn from international best practice for the establishment and operationalisation of caretaker governments from country contexts experiencing extreme divisions and mistrust, adapting them to Somalia’s context (a weak judiciary, unilateral constitutional amendments, and a fragmented opposition).

Summary of Recommendations

The first set of recommendations aims to establish the political foundations for a caretaker arrangement. The aim is to ensure that Somalia’s electoral process is managed neutrally, to guarantee a transition that reflects genuine democratic will (as feasible in Somalia) rather than manipulation, and to uphold the sovereignty imperative that makes electoral legitimacy a matter of national survival.

Currently, none of these objectives are guaranteed by existing institutions. Hence, my first recommendations, therefore, seek to establish mechanisms for neutral management of the 2026 electoral process. The recommendations are:

1. A political compact that articulates the purpose of a caretaker government (to conduct credible elections that demonstrate Somalia’s capacity for self-governance and protect its sovereignty) should be signed by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), all Federal Member States (FMSs), major opposition figures, representatives of civil society, traditional authorities, and international guarantors.

2. An election-time, non-political caretaker government should derive its legitimacy from multiple sources, the Federal Government of Somalia, FMSs, traditional and religious leaders, civil society and international guarantors, rather than from any single compromised national institution.

3. To ensure neutrality and to prevent any temptation that may arise when using a position within the caretaker government to seek office, all members of the caretaker government should sign binding commitments or a “self-denying resolutions”, making them ineligible to contest elections or accept political appointments for a specified period. This should be accompanied with public oath-taking before traditional and religious leaders.

4. Provisions for a caretaker government should include a limited mandate principle, focusing on organizing elections and maintaining basic public services (particularly security). It should limit any actions that would: (i) alter the constitution, (ii) enter into new international agreements or (iii) make significant policy decisions.

The second set of recommendations is centered around establishing the structure and selection process for the caretaker government itself. The recommendations are:

1. A Nomination Committee comprising representatives from the FGS, FMS, traditional elders, religious leaders and civil society should develop criteria and vet candidates for the Head of the Caretaker Government .

2. The Head of the Caretaker Government should be a figure commanding broad respect across political lines, with demonstrated commitment to national unity, no active political ambitions, and acceptance of the self-denying resolution.

3. A Caretaker Council of Secretaries should cover essential portfolios. It should comprise professionals and technocrats selected with sensitivity to clan balance but prioritising capability.

4. The National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) should be strengthened immediately with the establishment of the caretaker government, with full autonomy, adequate resources, authority over all election-related personnel, and technical support from international partners.

5. International support to the caretaker government should be robust but advisory. The UN mission should provide an advisory role and there should be an AU election observer mission deployed.

The final set of recommendations address timelines and safeguards against mission creep by the caretaker government.

1. Time-bound deadlines with a fixed calendar end-date should be established with consequences for non-delivery. Depending on the electoral model agreed through the national dialogues, the caretaker government’s mandate should range from six to twelve months, but should in no circumstances extend beyond 12 months from the end of the term of the current administration (May 15, 2026).

2. International, regional and national monitoring of compliance with deadlines should be mandatory, with regular public reporting on progress.

“Waloolo coloobay, way xoolo yarayaan, wayna xabaalo badiyaan.”

When brothers (or sisters) fight, they reduce their wealth and increase their number of graves.

In the days following Israel’s unilateral and illegitimate recognition of Somaliland, I found myself returning to this sage Somali proverb that serves as a grave warning for this moment.

2026 is set to be a consequential year for Somalia’s future. Political leaders in Somalia need to realise that the 2026 elections are not ordinary; they are not just another transfer of power or another iteration of the usual elite bargaining. Since the Israeli government recently announced its recognition of Somaliland, the 2026 elections represent a test as to whether Somalis can galvanise to defend recent assaults on our sovereignty.

If the electoral process in Somalia becomes mired in a prolonged crisis, the message sent to the world will be very simple: we cannot govern ourselves, our sovereignty is negotiable, and our internal divisions can be used to the advantage of external actors. We cannot afford to give the world this message.

Why Are These Elections Different?

Israel’s recent illegitimate recognition of Somaliland should help put to rest any illusions that the divisions within Somalia are solely internal matters. Our adversaries view the divisions within Somalia as opportunities for exploitation to advance their neocolonial agendas. We must wake up to the fact that we are being watched, mapped, and acted upon by external actors with their own geostrategic interests at stake.

The timing of this recognition is also not coincidental. We are experiencing the collapse of the post-World War II global order, and in doing so, the foreign powers are beginning to abandon the basic principles of international law regarding borders, which include the principle that borders should not be changed by force. In a multi-polar world, fragmented, divided and fragile countries are not given the luxury of time to work out their problems. Instead, they are often viewed as incoherent, and their territory is quietly coveted by interested outsiders. Furthermore, their sovereignty is viewed as a convenience, rather than an inviolable right.

Therefore, the manner in which Somalia holds its 2026 elections is of much greater importance to the Somali public and international community than previous elections have been. A credible and peaceful electoral process indicates a level of political and democratic maturity and social cohesion. A contested, chaotic, or manipulated electoral process, regardless of the winner, will indicate the opposite and invite additional challenges to Somalia’s sovereignty and unity.

Lessons learned from previous elections

As the 2026 elections approach, it is necessary to examine some difficult questions. After more than thirty years of attempting to build a stable state, why is Somalia’s democratic process still so fragile? What did we do wrong? Did we learn anything from our mistakes? Do we still view political competition as a form of existential war, rather than a normal part of the life of a republic?

No Somali election since the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012 has taken place without significant controversy, delays, and legitimacy concerns. The electoral timeline has been extended multiple times. Indirect selection processes have included accusations of vote buying and clan manipulation. Disputes over elections have worsened relations between the federal government and the federal member states. The history of Somali elections is consistent: elections become battlegrounds for zero-sum competition, rather than a mechanism for the peaceful transfer of power.

This history has consequences. Every disputed election weakens public and international confidence in Somalia’s institutions. Every delay sends a signal that the state is dysfunctional. Every crisis that draws in external mediators, whether it is the United Nations, the African Union, regional organisations, etc., reinforces the perception that Somalia cannot self-govern.

Fortunately, until now, the international community has maintained its commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, fortune alone for Somalia is not a viable long-term strategy. As long as we present ourselves as institutionally weak, we will invite actors who believe that our internal divisions are opportunities for exploitation.

Electoral integrity as a sovereignty issue

Somalia’s political class frequently overlook the fact that we must comply with certain internationally recognised standards of behaviour if we want to be considered credible participants in the global system. Electoral integrity is one such standard.

Electoral integrity extends beyond the act of voting on election day to encompass the entire electoral process. Each stage of the electoral process must occur without discrimination, favouritism, fraud, vote-buying and rigging.

As a result of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, the principle of electoral integrity is not a nice-to-have but a strategic imperative. A government that emerges from a credible electoral process earns legitimacy that cannot be replaced by external recognition. A government that emerges from a disputed electoral process, regardless of who comes out on top, will possess reduced legitimacy to advance national interests, defend itself against adversaries, and have insufficient political capital to achieve national unity.

In today’s world, legitimacy is not a luxury. It is a protective shield behind which we defend our sovereignty.

The risks we face

Let us consider the implications of a failed electoral process in the current context.

Al Shabaab is the most powerful violent extremist organisation operating in the Horn of Africa. It benefits greatly from political fragmentation and institutional weakness. A protracted electoral crisis will create opportunities for Al Shabaab to pursue its agenda. Simultaneously, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland provides Al Shabaab with a propaganda gift to portray engagement by external actors as encirclement and betrayal in a society where solidarity with the Palestinian cause is widespread. The more that Somalia is seen as politically dysfunctional, the larger this narrative will grow.

Beyond the extremist threat, Somalia risks becoming drawn into broader regional and global conflicts it cannot control or afford. The Red Sea crisis has already drawn major powers into a posture of military preparedness in the waters adjacent to Somalia. Any new alignment (perceived or real) can expand the theatre of conflict surrounding the Horn of Africa. If we Somalis are unable to resolve our internal disputes, we will have limited ability to navigate these risks.

And then there is the Somaliland issue itself. While Israel is the only UN member state to recognise Somaliland, the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League, and other key partners have reaffirmed Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, this support for Somalia’s sovereignty is not unconditional. It is based, in part, on the expectation that Somalia is a functioning state capable of addressing internal matters through legitimate political processes. If our electoral process in 2026 becomes chaotic, this solidarity may be undermined.

A path forward

So, what needs to be done?

First, Somalia’s political leadership, representing the Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States, and the opposition, must recognise that the 2026 elections represent a collective test and shared responsibility of demonstrating whether our country can shepherd a smooth, credible and fair elections rather than one filled with irregularities, vote-buying and rigging. The idea that elections are only fair when you win and unfair when you lose must be rejected. Somalia’s 2026 elections will be watched closely by friends and foes alike, necessitating that political actors put aside differences to ensure a smooth transfer of power, given the precarious situation our nation finds itself in.

Second, due to the multitude of threats to Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security, we must seriously consider whether the modus operandi of past electoral practices is sufficient for this moment in time. There is a reasonable argument for a short-term, non-political caretaker government comprising neutral, high-integrity figures, focused on holding credible, fair elections and ensuring the continuity of critical public services.

Any such arrangement will depend on the presence of well-respected, credible individuals who are viewed as relatively neutral, who agree to abide by specific timeframes, and who agree not to compete in the elections that they oversee. This is not a new concept in democratic transitions, as can be seen in Bangladesh’s current and past caretaker governments. Rather, it represents an understanding that extraordinary situations require extraordinary measures to safeguard electoral legitimacy and, by extension, Somalia’s sovereignty.

Third, Somalia must immediately convene a true National Consultative Conference – not a conference of rhetoric, but a serious attempt to improve the relationship between the political leadership of Somalia and to de-escalate tensions between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States, and to establish consensus on the electoral arrangements that all sides agree to follow.

Finally, Somalia’s political class must remember that electoral politics exists to serve the people, not the other way around. Millions of Somalis face drought, displacement, and food shortages. Their suffering should not continue because of electoral wrangling.

We have seen this before. In previous elections, the business of government ground to a halt as incumbents turned their attention to political survival, often a year before elections. Government institutions failed to perform, with the most vulnerable Somalis paying the ultimate price.

This must not happen again. Between now and the end of their mandate in May 2026, current officeholders have a responsibility to govern fully and without distraction.

And what comes after. This is precisely why Somalia needs a caretaker arrangement following May 2026, not merely to oversee elections, but to ensure that the functions of government do not collapse in the lead-up to them.

The choice before us

The Somali Youth League once galvanised a divided Somalia around a unifying idea: that Somalis belonged to a single political community and deserved sovereignty over our lands. This spirit must be revived, not as a nostalgic dream, but as a strategic necessity.

Future generations will judge us not by our good intentions. Instead, they will judge us by whether we met this moment.

The choice is ours. We can conduct a credible election that demonstrates to the world that we are more than capable of governing ourselves, that our sovereignty is inviolable, and that our divisions will not be exploited by those who mean to cause us harm. Or we can descend into another cycle of dispute, delay and dysfunction, diminishing our wealth and multiplying our graves.